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INTIMIDATION OF EMPLOYES. A recent case decided by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, O'Neil v. Behanna et al., 37 AtL..
Rep. 843 (Penna.) (July 15, 1897), clearly lays down the lawconcerning intimidation of employes by strikers or other persons in.
endeavoring to induce them to quit work. The court holds that it
is an unlawful intimidation of employes for a large number of
persons to surround them, and to follow them for a considerable
distance, urging them in a hostile manner not to go to work, and
calling them opprobrious names, though no physical violence isused, and persons so doing are liable in damages to the employer.
That when persons are going to a place of employment, either
under contract to work or in 'search of work, others have no rightto stop them and occupy their time without their consent or that
of their employer if actually employed, in order to peacefully urge
them not to go to work; and persons so doing are liable to the
employer in damages.
This decision was a reversal of a decree for defendants in a bill
in equity by Margaret O'Neil against Noah Behanna and others for
an injunction and damages.
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In Pennsylvania it is of great importance that the courts should
clearly and firmly maintain the grounds they have taken on this
subject, since the legislature has by statutes exempted employes
from liabilities for unlawful combinations to fix the price of labor:
Acts May 8, 1869, P. L. 126o; June I4, 1872, P. L. 1175 ; April
20, 1876, P. L. 45, and June 16, 1891, P. L. 3oo.
The constitutionality of these acts was questioned in Cote v.
Afurphy et al., 159 Pa. 420 (1894), on ground that they embraced only a particular class of citizens, but this point was not
decided. Should these acts be upheld and striking employes be
exempt from liabilities for their unlawful combination, it becomes
of the greatest importance that the courts should guard the interests
of the employers and of those employes who wish to work by
clearly pointing out what constitutes intimidation or interference
and by rigidly restraining reckless or irresponsible men from overstepping the line.
The decision is in accord with those in similar cases in the
United States Courts as well as previous decisions in Pennsylvania.
In re Doolittle and another, strikers, 23 Fed. Rep. 544 (1885), it
was held that a simple "request" to do or not to do a thing, made
by one or more of a body of strikers under circumstances calculated
to convey a threatening intimidation, with a design to hinder or
obstruct employes in the performance of their duties, is not less
obnoxious than the use of physical force for the same purpose. A
"request"
under such circumstances is a direct threat and an
intimidation, and will be punished as such. To the same effect,
U. S. v. Kane, 23 Fed. Rep. 748 (x885).
In _4furdock, Kerr&- Co. v. Walker et al., 152 Pa. 595 (1893),
it was held that a court of equity will restrain by injunction discharged employes, members of a union, from gathering about their
former employer's place of business, and from following the workmen whom he has employed in place of the defendants, from
gathering about the boarding houses of such workmen, and from
interfering with them by threats, menaces, intimidation, ridicule,
and annoyance, on account of their working for the plaintiff.
PRESUMPTION OF MOMENT OF DEATH; SuRvIVORSHIP.
Valuable
property rights often depend upon the question whether or not one
-oftwo persons who perished in the same disaster survived the other
for any appreciable time. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island
recently decided that where three sisters were killed in the same
.accident, the burning of their house, there was, in the absence of
all evidence, no presumption that any of them survived the others:
In re Wilbor et al., 37 Atl. Rep. 634 (June 8, 1897).
While the law on this subject is now well settled to be that laid
down in the above case, it did not take its present form without
many conflicting decisions. The difficulty arose from the fact that
the civil law had a definite rule on the subject, and its influence,
-especially in the ecclesiastical courts, warped the minds of English
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judges from the principle of the common law. According to the
civil law there is a definite series of presumptions arising from the
age and sex of the victims. For instance, a person under fifteen
or over sixty years of age is presumed to have perished before one
between those ages, while one of the male sex is presumed to have
outlived a female. This is the law to-day in Louisiana and California: Code Napollon, §§ 720-722 ; Louisiana Civil Code, §§ 936939 ; California Code, § 1963, c. 40.
In England the question of presumption of survivorship first
arose in the case of Rex v. Hay, i W. Bl. 640 (1767). Lord
Mansfield refused to give a decision on the point, saying that there
However, sevwas no precedent, and the case was compromised.
eral later cases definitely followed the rule of the civil law, holding
that a husband was presumed to have outlived a wife, and that
where two brothers died together the stronger was presumed to
have outlived the weaker: Colvin v. Procurator-Gen., i Hagg, 92
(1827) ; In re Selwyn, 3 Hagg, 748 (1831); Sillick v. Booth,
i Young & Coll. I17 (842).
But the effect of these decisions has been swept away by the
leading case of Underwoodv. Wing, 19 Beav. 459, affirmed in the
House of Lords under the title Wing v. Angrave, 8 H. L. C. 183
(x86o). In this case one Underwood and his wife left England on
a ship which was wrecked, all being lost except one man, who
testified that Underwood and his wife were washed overboard by
the same wave. A contest having arisen over Underwood's will,
one of the provisions of which made a certain disposition of property "in case my said wife shall die in my lifeime," the question
was fairly presented to the court. Although a strong effort was
made by counsel to show that the survivorship of the husband must
be presumed, on the authority of the cases cited above, together
with the fact that Underwood was an active man, a strong swimmer,
etc., yet the Master of the Rolls refused to so decide, laying down
the rule that where there is no evidence of survivorship then mo
presumption arises that either party died first, but the person who
comes into court basing his claim on survivorship must affirmatively
prove that survivorship. This rule has been universally followed
in all the courts of the United States except those of California and
Louisiana.
The case of Underwood v. Wing did not decide that, in the
absence of all evidence to the contrary, a presumption arose that
the man and wife perished at the same moment. "This," says
Mr. Best in his work on Evidence, Am. Ed., p. 395, "would be
establishing an artificial presumption against manifest probability.
The practical consequence is, however, nearly the same; because,
if it cannot be shown which died first, the fact will be treated by
the tribunal as a thing.unascertainable, so that, for all that appears
to the contrary, both individuals may have died at the some
moment."
Moreover, the rule will not be applied unless evidence
on the question is wholly lacking. Very slight evidence will be
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Tegarded as sufficient, such as the position of the victims when the
disaster occurred; in short, all relevant facts except those which
show merely the physical condition of the parties and their ability
to resist death: Newell v. Nichols, 12 Hun, 604, affirmed 75 N. Y.
78 (1878) ; Ehle's Est., 73 Wis. 445 (1889).
NATURAL GAS; "MINERALS
TIONAL LAW; PUBLIC POLICY.

FERE

NATUR!E";

CONSTITU-

In Townsend v. State, 47 N. E.
19 (Indiana) May 18, 1897, it was decided that an act punishing
the burning of natural gas in flambeau lights as a wasteful use
thereof, does not deprive the owner of property without due pro-cess of law, nor does it take property by law without just compensation. This marks another successful attempt on the part of
the legislature to control the use of natural gas. State v. Gas
Company, 120 Ind. 575, 22 N. E. 778 (1889) declared unconstitutional a law prohibiting the piping of natural gas to any point
without the state. This law was said not to be a legitimate exercise of police power, but an attempt to regulate interstate commerce. Jamieson v. Oil Company, 128 Ind. 555, 28 N. E. 76
(1891) (Olds, J., dissenting,) held constitutional an act prohibiting a pressure of more than 300 pounds to the inch, which was
designed to accomplish, and did accomplish, indirectly, the same
-endas that to which the former statute was directed. Peopile's
Gas Company v. Tyner, 131 Ind. 277 at 281, 282 (1892), quoting Westmoreland, etc., Gas Co. v.De WVitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 At.
724 (1889), classes water, oil and gas as mineralsferiz naturte subject to the same public control as wild animals.
The principal case follows this and finds justification for state
regulation of natural gas and oil in the admitted right to pass
game laws. On game and game laws, see 8 Am. & Eng. Ency.
Law 1024, et seq. In Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 16o Mass. 157
35 N. E. 454 (1893) a statute imposed a penalty on every person
who "sells or offers or exposes for sale or has in his possession a
trout" except alive, during the close season. This statute was
decided to apply constitutionally to trout artificially propagated
and maintained. In Gentile v.State, 29 Ind. 409, at 415 (1868)
a statute was decided to be constitutional which forbade the taking
of any fish in any way for two years, even by an owner of the lake
or stream.
The police power of the State over property has not been confined to things fere nature. Rideout v. Knox, 140 Mass. 368,
19 N. E. 390 (1889) held constitutional an act declaring that any
fence unnecessarily exceeding six feet inheight maliciously erected
or maintained for the purpose of annoying adjoining property
holders or owners isa nuisance, and granting an action to anyone
injured by such fence. In Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, i i Metc.
(Mass.) 55 (1846) the statute imposed a penalty on "any person
who shall take, etc., any stones, gravel or sand, from any of the
beaches in the town of Chelsea."
This.was held to apply to the
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-owners of the soil as well as to strangers and was constitutional,
.although it provided no compensation for the owners, since preservation of the sea wall was essential to the public.
But the most striking instances of the exercise of such power
.have been game laws. In Lawtan v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 14
Sup. Ct. Rep. 499 (1894) (Fuller, C. J., Brewer and Field, JJ.,
,dissenting,) the statute in question, declared nets, etc., used in
violation of game laws, public nuisances which the official game
protectors were authorized to destroy. The act was held constitu,tional. See Smith v. AMaryland, 18 How. (U. S.) 74 (1855);
AfcCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 395 (1876). In Geer v. State of
Connecticut, i6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6oo (1896), not cited in the principal case, it was held that the ownership of game within the
dimits of a state, so far as it is capable of ownership, is in the State
-for the benefit of all its people in common, and that the police
power authorizes a State to forbid the killing of game to be transported beyond its limits. Harlan and Field, JJ., dissented. Mr.
Justice White, delivering the majority opinion, refers to Pothier's
treatise on Property. Pothier classes among res communes air,
water which runs in rivers, the sea and its shores, and animals
.ferw natura; and the learned justice shows that property in wild
beasts is regarded as common or in the state over all the continent
of Europe. In 2 Blackstone's Commentaries, at pages 14, 394,
•410, wild animals are classed with air, light and water as peculiarly
subject to governmental authority.
The ownership, then, of gas and oil in their natural condition,
.as well as that of wild animals, being in the State, the latter can
-make such regulations concerning them as it sees fit. If this decision arrived at by the Supreme Court of Indiana be carried to its
logical end, it would appear that the State may prescribe the
,exact manner in which the owners shall use the gas they have
drawn from their own land, or even forbid absolutely the use of
.gas in any form.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW;

EXCLUSION

FROM

OFFICE;

POLITICAL

A frequent provision in state constitutions, after providing a form of official oath, is that "no other oath, declaration,
.or test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public
The kind of "test" meant is generally believed to be a
trust."
mental condition, such as religious or political opinion: 2 Story
Const. §§ Ir47, 1149. It is plain that where the constitution
.provides qualifications for holding office any legislative enactment
conflicting therewith is void.
The question has been raised as regards the right of the legislature to require certain political affiliations as a qualification, in
face of the above constitutional clause. This question was decided in Pearce v. Ste~phen , 45 N. Y. Suppl. 422 (May i8, 1897).
In that case the statute in question provided that the two police
commissioners of a certain district should not belong to the same
OPINION.
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political party, nor be of the same political opinion on state and
national politics. The act was held to be constitutional on the
authority of Rogers v. Common Council of Buffalo, 123 N. Y. 173
(189o).
In the latter case the court held that no person was
excluded by reason of his political opinion, inasmuch as the act
did not compel the selection to be made from any certain party or
parties, but that all were equally eligible until two should be
chosen from any one party. The act provided that no more than
two of the board should be taken from the same party. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts sustained a similar statute:
Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375 (1889).
In Michigan it is held that such an act is unconstitutional, because it makes party affiliation a conditioTn to holding the office,
and thus requires another "test"
contrary to the constitution:
Attorney-Gen'lv. Detroit Common Council, 58 Mich. 213 (1885).
In Indiana the same view is taken: Evansville v. State, i18 Ind.
426 (i889) ; State v. Blend, 23 N. E. 51i (i8go).
The better opinion seems to be that such provisions are discretionary only, and the statute valid: State v. Seavey, 35 N. W.
228 (Neb. 1887); State v. Bennett, Id. 235; Baltimore v. State,
15 Md. 376; -4fcDermott v. Lapham, 27 Atl. 220 (R. I. 1894);
Comm. v. Plaisted (supra). See State v. McAllister, 18 S. E. 770.
(W. Va. 1894) ; Rathbone v. Wirth, 40 N. Y. Suppl. 535 (1896).
BOND;

LIABILITY OF CUSTODIANS

OF PUBLIC

FUNDS.

Bosby-

In theshellv. United States, 16 U. S. C. C. A. 474 (1897).
above case the Circuit Court of Appeals has lately passed upon the
question of the liability of the custodians of public funds, for
money stolen from them without any fault or negligence on their
part. The defendant was the Superintendent of the United States.
Mint at Philadelphia. The condition of the bond sued upon was
as follows: "Now, therefore, if the said B. shall faithfully and diligently perform, execute and discharge all and singular the duties
of said office according to the laws of the United States, then this
Section 3506 of the United
bond to be void and of no effect."
States Revised Statutes, which it was agreed should be read into
the bond, is as follows: "The superintendent of each mint shall
receive and safely keep until legally withdrawn all moneys or
bullion which shall be for the use or expenses of the mint. He
shall receive all bullion brought to the mint for assay or coinage;
he shall be the keeper of all bullion or coin in the mint, except
The
when the same is legally in the hands of other officers."
main question of law raised in the case was on the defendant's
position that the bond in suit imposed upon him a liability only for
the faithful and diligent performance of the duties of the office of
superintendent and not a liability for a felonious taking of bullion
without any fault or negligence on his part. The Court declined
to take this position and cited the cases of United States v. Prescott, 3 How. 578 (1845) ; U. S. v. Dashiell, 4 Wall. i8z
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(i866) ; Boyden v. U. S., 13 Wall. 17 (1871) in support of their
-decision that the obligation was to keep safely without qualification
-or exception. The defendant relied on United States v. Thomas,
15 Wall. 337 (1873), in which it was decided bya majority of the
Court that the forcible seizure of public property by the public
*4enemy, without fault or neglect of the officer in charge, excused
compliance with the condition of the official bond, the Court thus
distinguishing this case from U S. v. Prescott (supra), and the
subsequent cases affirming it. That decision was based on two
grounds. i. That the ordinary circumstances which would dis-charge a bailee for hire, were not sufficient to absolve a depositary
of public funds, on account of an imperative necessity of public
policy, viz., the prevention of collusive defenses. 2. That the
depositary, having given a bond to pay or deliver, was bound by
that contract, according to the rigid terms annexed by law to such
-covenants. From the decision in the latest decided case, U S. v.
Thomas, there was a strong dissent by Mr. Justice Miller, protesting
against the attempted distinction in the facts of the cases, and the
inevitable weakening of the principles underlying the rule by
. llowing an exception in the case of funds seized by public enemy.
He believed in an entire abandonment of those principles as being
incorrect, and said "on sound principles the bond should not be
-construed to extend the obligation of the depositary beyond what
the law imposes upon him, though it may contain words of express
promise to pay over the money. The true construction of such
promise is to pay when the law would require it of the receiver if
no bond had been given, the object of the bond being to procure
sureties for the performance of the obligation."
In this contention there is much force, and the near future may see it adopted as
the rule.
Many of the state courts have reached a different conclusion
from that of the United States Court of Appeals in this case:
York v. Watson, 15 S. C. I (1879) ; Cumberland v. Pennell,
.69 Me. 357 (1879).
A well-considered case so holding is People
v. Wilson, i Colo. 199 (1893), fully annoted in 22 Lawy..Rep.
Ann. 449. See also State v. Houston, 78 Ala. 576 (x885).
The two following cases, both decided in 1896, go over the
-whole ground exhaustively, and conclude that to hold an officer to
absolute insurance is neither equitable nor in accordance with the
'best precedent: Statev. Copeland, 3 4 S. W. 427 (Tenn.) ; Healds.burg v. Afulligan, 45 Pac. 337 (1896), (Cal.).
LESSOR AND LESSEE; DEFECTIVE PREMISES;

7'6 STRANGERS.

LESSOR'S LIABILITY

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held in a
recent case that a lessor who retains no control of the leased premises, the lessee being under covenant to repair, is not liable for an
injury to one entering by the lessee's invitation, by falling into an "
unguarded opening between the freight elevator and the outer wall
,of the shaft ; the building in such respect being neither a nuisance,

